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Abstract. This article examines the effects of the negative income 
tax, in a matching model, on labor market participation. We show that 
the introduction of such instrument reduces unemployment and improves 
the situation of the poorest. But, amazingly, it provokes a fall on labor 
market participation principally because the agents are then less 
selective. We find another surprising result: despite the rise on 
participation, the increasing of unemployment benefits improves the 
situation of the firms at the expense of workers. 
 
Keywords: matching; participation; negative income tax. 
 
 
JEL Codes: D63, H21, J41, J64. 
REL Codes: 12F, 12G. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Volume XIX (2012), No. 1(566), pp. 41-56 Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
 
42 
1. Introduction 
 
To answer the perspectives of demographic evolution and more particularly 
the problem of pension financing, the European councils of Lisbon and Stockholm 
already fixed ambitious objectives concerning the rates of employment in the 
European Union before 2011. It is wished that the rate of employment be then 
equal to 70 % of the whole population old enough to work, with at least 60 % as 
regards the women and 50 % for the oldest workers (from 55 to 64 years). Now, 
the realization of these objectives obviously implies an improvement of the labor 
market conditions and, possibly, a revision of the redistributive systems in order to 
increase substantially the participation rate. In order to reduce the disincentive 
effects of the going back to work, measures consisting in the preservation of the 
allowances after the return to activity were imagined. The NIT was imagined by M. 
Friedman in 1962 and resumed by neo-keynesians such as J. Tobin to avoid the 
traps of assistance favouring an encouragement of employment.  
In this article, we develop an analysis on the effects of the NIT in a 
matching model with horizontal differentiation of the workers and jobs 
(Marimon, Zilibotti, 1999, pp. 266-291). However, we consider, here, the labor 
supply at the extensive margin so as to study the effects of a policy based on a 
NIT scheme on the labor market participation. Authors such as Pissarides 
(1990) or Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003) have already introduced an endogenous 
participation into standard job search models. As in these articles, we are 
interested in the relations between frictions on the labor market and the labor 
supply. However, none of these works considers, as we do here, the 
implications on the decision of participation linked to externalities inferred by 
the meeting process between firms and workers. In other words, we point out 
the very particular interactions between employment policy, selectivity of the 
agents, productivity and participation, engendering all the more interesting 
results as they are a priori unexpected. Indeed, we verify that the 
implementation of a tax credit allows to reduce inequalities for the benefit of 
the poorest and to increase employment. However, contrary to what we could 
expect, the tax credit can lead to a decrease of the participation essentially cause 
of a lesser selectivity of the agents. Furthermore, the results present another 
unexpected effect concerning the unemployment compensation system. Indeed, 
in this framework, the increase in unemployment benefits favors firms and 
provokes a degradation of the situation of the workers. This article gets 
organized in the following way. In the section 2, we present the model. We 
solve it in a section 3. Then, we specify and confirm the results of the analysis 
by proceeding to quantitative exercise in a fourth section. Finally, we conclude 
our study in a fifth and last section. Negative Income Tax and Labor Market Participation. A Short Run Analysis 
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2. The model 
 
We consider an economy including two risk neutral agents: the population 
susceptible to work and firms. Among all the people "capable" of working (N), 
some integrate the labor market ("active persons", NA) and the others prefer to stay 
outside ("non-working - inactive - population",  NI). At each period, the agents 
capable of working, heterogeneous and having an infinite horizon, decide 
according to their utility in each situation (that we shall define later) if they 
participate to the labor market (by trying to find a job) either if they stay "inactive" 
taking advantage of social-security benefits and of their household production. 
Besides, firms, in number K, produce the same good and offer each a single job. 
These jobs are also heterogeneous and we suppose that, at each period, filled jobs 
can become vacant with a probability s. Besides, among active people (NA), some 
will have a job (L) while the others will be unemployed persons (U) and among 
jobs offered by firms (K), some will be filled (L) while the others will be vacant 
(V). Consequently, we have: NA - U = K - V . 
All the agents have the same discount rate r and R represent the sum (1+r). 
To describe the differentiation of the workers and the jobs, we use the analytical 
framework of Salop (1979). We consider that workers ("active people") and firms 
are uniformly distributed on a circle of circumference equal to 2. This distribution 
is exogenous. The position of a worker on the circle represents his "type" of 
qualification while that of the firm represents the exact "type" of qualification 
whom it looks for. The distance l (between 0 and 1) separating a worker of a firm 
measures the adequacy between the profiles of each. The adequacy is completed 
when l=0 and the mismatch is maximum for l=1. The productivity of a worker is 
then a decreasing function of this distance l noted y(l ) with y’(l )<0 and y”(l )≤0. 
Let us remind that every firm employs only a single worker and its production is 
determined by the productivity of this one. 
Concerning the meeting process (Petrongolo, Pissarides, 2001, pp. 390-
431), we consider that the firm which an unemployed worker is going to meet is 
taken at random among all the firms. Let us note U the number of unemployed 
workers and V the number of vacant jobs. The labor market tightness is then 
noted θ=V /U. Let us suppose that λ represent the maximal distance which can 
separate an employee of his employer. To provide a vacant job, the firm needs 
to meet only a single worker filling the requirements, that is a worker whose 
"type" is at a distance not exceeding this mismatch threshold λ. The association 
employer/employee is then productive enough and thus practicable. We show 
(appendix 1) that the probability to fill a vacant job, noted q, is determined by: 
q = 1 - e
-λ/θ                                                                                              (1) Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
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We notice that a greater selectivity of firms and workers (i.e. a decline of 
λ) has for consequence a decrease of the probability to fill a vacant job. The 
probability to be hired, noted p, satisfies: 
p = (1 - e
-λ/θ)θ                                                                                          (2) 
This probability p is an increasing function of the threshold λ. We show that 
p is also an increasing function of the labor market tightness θ (appendix 2). 
 
2.1. Intertemporal utilities and profits 
 
Every agent arbitrates between two choices: participate to the labor 
market by becoming an unemployed worker susceptible to reach employment 
or stay out of this market and benefit from the return on its household 
production and on the social-security benefits. Let us suppose that z represents 
the value of the household production of the "inactive" people and m all the 
social-security benefits which he/she perceives. His/her intertemporal utility is 
then written as follows: 
WI = z + m + R
-1W ˆ   with   W ˆ = max{WU; WI}                                        (3) 
The greater is the amount of the social-security benefits from which benefits 
an inactive worker, the greater is the proportion of those who decide to stay out of 
the labor market. In the same way, the more an inactive people benefits from 
his/her household production, the more it is attractive to keep the "status" of 
"inactive". On the other hand, if the unemployed worker’s situation tends to 
become more interesting (thanks to, for example, an increase of the amount of 
unemployment benefits or of the probability of hiring), the participation rate will be 
higher. When a worker obtains a job, his/her productivity, y(l), and thus his/her 
(gross) salary, w(l), is going to depend on the distance l which separates his/her 
“type” of that of the firm which hired him/her. We note WE(l) the intertemporal 
utility of such a worker. As regards unemployed workers, we consider that they 
benefit from unemployment benefits, noted b. Their intertemporal utility WU also 
depends on the distance λ, which affects the rate of hiring (p) and the expected 
utility of an employee  E W . As the distributions on the circle of workers and jobs 
are supposed uniform, the expected value of a variable x is written as follows: 
dl l x x l x E ) ( 1 )] ( [
0 ∫ = =
λ
λ
                                                                             (4) 
We introduce a linear taxation scheme such as the Negative Income Tax 
schematizing the taxation progressiveness. We assume a tax function as Negative Income Tax and Labor Market Participation. A Short Run Analysis 
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follows: t(w) = - α + γw. The amount of the tax t(w) paid by each employee 
depends on the level of his/her income. The peculiarity of the fiscal table holds 
in the fact that only the workers whose income exceeds a certain threshold (the 
average wage) pay a tax, while those who earn low incomes benefit from a tax 
credit. Besides, the workers who earn the average wage are tax-exempt 
(t(w(0))= t  : the highest tax paid by the worker perfectly adapted to his/her job; 
t(w(λ))=t : tax credit perceived by the least productive employee. The budget 
constraint satisfies then: 
∫ =
) 0 (
) (
0 ) (
w
w
dw w t
λ
                                                                                        (5) 
In the stationary state, the intertemporal utilities WE(l) and WU satisfy: 
WE(l) = w(l) - t[w(l)] + R
-1[sWU + (1 - s)WE(l)]                                       (6) 
WU = b + R
-1[pWE + (1 - p)WU ]                                                               (7) 
The jobs which firms have are vacant or filled. Let us note JF(l) the value 
of a filled job: 
JF(l) = y(l) - w(l) + R
-1[sJV + (1 - s)JF (l)]                                                (8) 
This value of a filled job depends on the immediate net gain and the 
future profits dependent on a possible separation between employer and 
employee. The value of a vacant job JV is a function of the mismatch threshold 
λ. This threshold indeed affects the probability q to provide this job as well as 
the expected value of a filled job  F J . We have then: 
JV = -c + R
-1[q F J + (1 - q)JV ]                                                                  (9) 
As long as it is not filled, the job costs c to the firm (i.e. the employer has 
to invest to create this job and "to look for" an employee). 
 
2.2. The surplus sharing 
 
According to the generalized Nash rule, the surplus created by a couple 
employer/employee is distributed between both agents according to their 
respective bargaining strength. We shall note β (0<β<1) the workers bargaining 
strength. The maximization program of the surplus verifies then: 
Maxβ ln[WE(l) - WU ] + (1 - β)[JF (l) - JV ]                                             (10) 
Then, the following first order condition satisfies: 
β[1 – t’(w(l))][JF (l) - JV ] = (1 - β)[WE(l) - WU ]                                    (11) Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
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The tax schedule gives a constant marginal tax rate (t’(w(l))) that we shall 
note γ. The previous equation can be rewritten in the following way: 
β(1 - γ)[JF (l) - JV ] = (1 - β)[WE(l) - WU ]                                               (12) 
So, the surplus of the workers with a filled job is represented by: 
WE(l) - WU = β[WE(l) - WU + JF (l) - JV ] - βγ[JF (l) - JV ]                       (13) 
It seems that the proportion of the total surplus got by a worker is lower than 
his/her bargaining strength (β). Indeed, considering the tax scheme, the average tax 
rate is increasing with regard to the wage. Consequently, firms take advantage of 
the fact that workers are incited to negotiate lower wages to get a greater part of the 
collective surplus. The association employer-employee is practicable only if it 
generates a positive total surplus. Consequently, the threshold λ, which corresponds 
to the couple employer/employee the least effective possible (beyond λ, the 
association does not engender a positive surplus), satisfies: 
WE(l) - WU + JF (l) - JV = 0 ⇒ WE(λ) = WU ⇔  JF (λ) = JV                     (14) 
 
3. Model equilibrium 
 
3.1. Optimal selectivity and labor market tightness 
 
Using the relation defining the mismatch threshold and the surplus 
sharing process, we deduce the following relation between the labor market 
tightness (θ) and the mismatch threshold (λ) (see appendix 3): 
[] [] ) ( ) ( ) ( 1
1 ) ( s r m z t y t y y q c s r + − − − − + −
−
− = + λ λ
βγ
β                              (15) 
In space (λ; θ), this relation (λ ≡ JC (θ; .)) is represented by an increasing 
curve (JC) (Figure 1). Since, on the one hand, [ y - y(λ)], [w(λ) - y(λ)] and the 
probability for a firm to meet a worker are increasing in λ and, on the other 
hand, q is decreasing in θ, the equation (15) implies that any increase in labor 
market tightness causes a rise of the mismatch threshold. When θ increases, the 
probability for firms to meet workers decreases. Therefore, in order to 
compensate for this effect, they are less selective in the hiring process (λ 
increases). Moreover, for a given level λ, this relation implies that an increase in 
a maximum tax credit causes a reduction in labor market tightness (the curve 
(JC) moves (JC’)). Furthermore, if WU > WI, then the whole population wants 
to participate to the labor market and if WU < WI, everyone prefers to stay 
inactive. Therefore, at the equilibrium, the labor market participation satisfies: Negative Income Tax and Labor Market Participation. A Short Run Analysis 
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WU = WI                                                                                                 (16) 
The utility of an unemployed worker is, at the migration equilibrium, equal 
to that of an inactive. Therefore, from equations (14) and (16), we deduce: 
WU = WE(λ) = WI                                                                                   (17) 
Note that the expected utility of an employee depends on his/her decision 
to participate or not to the labor market. Therefore, for there to be trade-off 
between participation to the labor market and stay out of it, the agents must 
undergo a loss of instant gain (z  +  m  -  b) by participating and becoming 
unemployed. Otherwise, everyone would participate. With this migration 
equilibrium condition, we obtain (see appendix 3) a decreasing relationship 
between tightness θ and the mismatch threshold λ: 
[] ) ( 1
) )( 1 ( ) ( b m z s r t y y p − + −
+ − = + − γ
βγ λ β                                               (18) 
In space (λ;θ), this relationship (θ ≡ CW (λ; .)) is represented by a downward 
curve denoted CW (Figure 1). Given that the probability of finding a job p and the 
difference [ y - y(λ)] are increasing in λ and p is increasing in θ, the equation (18) 
implies a decreasing relationship between the mismatch threshold and the labor 
market tightness. The intuition behind this relationship is quite simple. For 
arbitrating agents between participate or not to the labor market, an increase in λ 
means a greater probability of hiring. Consequently, unemployment is made more 
attractive by increasing the number of unemployed people and thus reduces the 
labor market tightness. It may be noted also that λ given, increasing the amount of 
tax credit awarded to the least productive employee means an increase in θ (the 
curve (CW) moves (CW’)) while a lower welfare benefits or higher unemployment 
benefits causes a decrease in θ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Negative income tax and selectivity Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
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Proposition 1. In a matching model with differentiated skills, the 
introduction of a tax credit makes agents less selective reducing the matching 
quality and the average productivity. 
 
3.2. Labor market participation 
 
At the stationary equilibrium, the number of workers who lose their job 
must equal the number of unemployed workers who find a job. Therefore, we 
consider L the employment level. This equilibrium condition implies: 
pU = sL = s(NA - U) and qV = sL = s(K - V )                                         (19) 
Therefore, combining the two previous equations, we obtain the 
expression of the active population NA as a function of θ and of λ: 
)] ; ( [
)] ; ( [
θ λ θ
θ λ
q s
p s K N A +
+ =                                                                             (20) 
Equation (20) corresponds to a simple accounting relationship satisfied at the 
flows equilibrium. Indeed, an increase in the active population means an influx of 
unemployed people into the labor market which, given the number of jobs, makes 
the market tightness lower. Similarly, an increasing number of firms means a 
higher number of vacancies and thus a rise in labor market tightness. 
Therefore, with a variable participation, the model equilibrium satisfies 
the following definition: 
 
Definition 1. The labour market equilibrium is a set of variables (λ
*; θ
*; 
NA
*) which jointly satisfy equations (15), (18) and (20). 
 
4. Quantitative analysis 
 
We consider an explicit function of productivity, linear form, depending 
on the “distance” separating the employee from his/her firm, such that: y(l) = y0 
- ψl. We retain the starting values of the following parameters: β= 0,5; ψ= 5; s = 
0,02; c = 3; r = 0; N = 2; b = 2; m = 2; z = 2; K = 1 and y0 = 16. Moreover, in 
the tables, SB represents the budgetary balance, WE(λi), the utility of the poorest 
employee in the initial simulation and SG, the collective surplus. 
Table 1 
Negative income tax 
  ￿  ￿  NA  U  y   w   ) 0 ( WE   ) ( W i E λ  
E W   JV  F J   SG   
-t   +  +  -  -  -  -  -  +  -  +  +  +   
 Negative Income Tax and Labor Market Participation. A Short Run Analysis 
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As showed in Proposition 1, it appears (Table 1) that the introduction of a 
Negative Income Tax makes firms and workers less selective. However, this 
increase in the mismatch threshold λ  causes a decrease in the average 
productivity. Indeed, the tax credit enjoyed by "low wages" encourages workers 
to lower their reservation wage, their income remains unchanged, and therefore 
to accept jobs farther from the type that would suit them perfectly. These jobs 
are then less effective and therefore tend to have lower average productivity. 
Moreover, this lower selectivity of agents tends to increase the probability 
of filling jobs for firms and the probability of being hired for unemployed 
people. In fact, since the number of firms is constant, increasing λ 
simultaneously causes an increase in employment and a decline in the number 
of vacancies. Therefore, the greater decrease in unemployment causes a rise of 
the labor market tightness. But this decline of the number of unemployed 
people (and also of the unemployment rate) is explained by two simultaneous 
"phenomena": the increase of the hiring probability p (due to higher threshold 
λ) and the decrease of participation. The decline of the active population, which 
is verified in Table 1, is due to the fall of the expected utility of an employee 
E W  following the increase λ  (because of lower average wage). Indeed, the 
future as employee appears less attractive, then a larger proportion of the 
unemployed people withdraws from the labor market leading to an increase of 
the hiring probability for those who remain. Therefore, given that the utility of 
an unemployed worker, WU, is determined by the migration equilibrium 
condition (WU = WI), increasing p can then compensate for the decline of  E W . 
But this observation does not match what is expected from the introduction of a 
Negative Income Tax. Indeed, while his/her real goal is a priori to encourage 
unemployed to return to work by encouraging them to accept jobs barely 
interesting (that is indeed the case), it appears that this public policy reduces the 
attractiveness of the activity comparatively to inactivity. 
The Table 1 shows the effects of a NIT on utilities and profits. Firstly, in 
terms of incomes, it appears that the net wage of the lowest paid employee 
remains constant despite the decrease in w(λ). This result was expected since we 
have seen previously that at the equilibrium, WE(λ)=WI. Indeed, the tax credit 
offsets the decrease in his/her direct income, but, then, worker supports an 
increasing mismatch compared to firm’s needs and consequently, the minimum 
productivity (y(λ)) and the current profit (y(λ) - w(λ)) decrease. However, we 
show that the intertemporal utility of the marginal worker, "the lowest paid" at 
the beginning (which corresponds in the simulation at λi), increases. Indeed, this 
worker, through the tax credit, earned a net income higher than what he had 
been receiving previously. So, the introduction of a NIT favors the most Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
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disadvantaged workers since, whatever the situation of the other employees, the 
situation of the poorest improves. Nevertheless, the highest net wage (w(0) - t ) 
decreases. Indeed, the utility of the richest workers declines because of a lower 
selectivity and their contribution to the cost of the NIT. However, the decline in 
average productivity is lower than the average wage. Therefore, the average 
values of filled jobs  F J  and of vacancies JV increase. 
 
Remark 1. Even if it may cause a negative effect on the labor market 
participation, the introduction of a NIT looks interesting as a redistributive 
policy in favor of the poorest but also as a policy of reducing the unemployment 
rate. In addition, it appears that this policy may even lead to an increase of the 
collective surplus since the expected profits of firms increase though the 
introduction of the NIT causes in average a loss of job productivity. 
 
Table 2 presents the unemployment benefits effects on different variables 
of the economy. 
Table 2 
Unemployment benefits 
  ￿  ￿ NA  U u  y   w   WE(0) 
E W   JV 
F J   SG 
b  - -  + + + +  -  -  -  +  +  - 
 
It appears that rising unemployment benefits causes an increase in labor 
market participation (since the utility of being unemployed is therefore more 
attractive) leading to a decrease in the probability of hiring p (with an increase 
in the number of unemployed and in the unemployment rate). The process stops 
when the migration equilibrium condition (WU = WI) is respected again. Note 
that since the number of firms is considered constant, new jobs can not be 
opened so as to increase competition among firms and to absorb the influx of 
inactive into the labor market. 
Therefore, the labor market tightness tends to decline and it appears that 
increasing the probability q to fill vacancies increased firms requirements. Firms 
become more selective (decrease in λ) and that improves the matching quality and 
thus the average productivity. However, an unusual and unexpected effect is the 
decline of the average wage w. Indeed, one might expect that the increase in 
unemployment benefits leads to increase wage demands of workers and thus to 
increase average productivity. However, given that the unemployed workers are 
more numerous and that the unemployment rate rises sharply, competition between 
workers is such that the average wage goes down. Therefore, the utility of all the 
workers decreases so that some of them (the employees initially the poorest) are 
advised to leave their job (to be unemployed). Negative Income Tax and Labor Market Participation. A Short Run Analysis 
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Remark 2. An increasing in unemployment benefits takes advantage only 
to firms. Even if this measure can increase the labor market participation, it 
appears that the competition between workers is then such that the average 
wage tends to decrease. 
 
5. Final comments 
 
These results should obviously be considered in light of the different 
assumptions. In particular, given the rigidity of firms number, we can consider that 
our approach is rather short-term course. That is precisely what makes it 
particularly interesting here. Indeed, it is clear that the analysis of long period is 
only of interest if economic policy has the opportunity to continue. Therefore, to 
consider for example that the introduction of a NIT may, in the short run, reduce 
the labor market participation tends to relativize the interest of the implementation 
of the policy and that, regardless effects that are expected in the long term. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Matching function 
We assume that U  unemployed know exactly the location of the V 
vacancies and that each unemployed apply in each period. The probability that a 
vacancy receives a given application is then equal to 1/V and, consequently, the 
probability that it does not receive is equal to (1 - 1/V). However, a vacancy 
may receive several applications including some that are not suitable (the hiring 
of these workers there would not in fact sufficient productivity). This assumes 
that firms are able to identify all applications. In the model used here, the 
proportion of applications that may be suitable for a particular job is equal to 
λU  (λ  is the maximum distance (mismatch threshold) can separate the 
qualification held by an employee and one required by an employer. Therefore, 
the probability that a given vacancy receives no suitable application is equal to 
(1-1/V)
λU . The number of hires in each period is then given by: 
( ) ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − − =
U
V
V H
λ 1 1 1 
However, we have: 
( ) ( ) []
V
U
V
U 1 1 ln exp 1 1 1 − = − − λ
λ
 
Therefore, assuming a high number of unemployed and job vacancies: 
( ) ( )
V
U
V
U λ
λ
− = − − exp 1 1 1  
If we denote θ = V /U, the number of hires, the probability of filling a 
vacancy and the probability of finding a job for the unemployed are given by: 
V e H ) 1 ( θ
λ −
− =    θ
λ −
− = e q 1   θ θ
λ
) 1 (
−
− = e p  Negative Income Tax and Labor Market Participation. A Short Run Analysis 
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2. Analysis function p(θ; λ) 
 
We have: 
p(θ; λ) = θq(θ; λ) = θ(1 - e
-λ/θ) 
The derivative of p(.) with respect to θ is given by: 
θ λ θ λ
θ
λ
θ
/ / 1
− − − − =
∂
∂
e e
p
 
We show that this derivative is defined on the interval [0; 1]. Therefore, 
the probability p is an increasing function of θ. 
 
3. Selectivity and job creation process 
 
Using equation (6), the intertemporal utilities of workers satisfy: 
) W W ( s w R W r U E E − − =                                                                           (21) 
[ ] [ ] U E E W ) ( W s t ) ( w R ) ( rW − − − = λ λ λ                                                         (22) 
Can then be determined through equations (7), (21) and (22) the income 
expressions of the less productive employee and of an employee: 
[]
s r
W W p
s r
b t ) ( w R W ) ( W
U E
U E +
− −
+
− − = − λ λ                                                (23) 
p s r
) b w ( R W W U E
+ +
− = −                                                                                   (24) 
Therefore, in terms of incomes, it appears, using equations (14), (23) and 
(24), that: 
p s r
) b w ( p t b ) ( w
+ +
− + + = λ                                                                          (25) 
As workers, we can rewrite equation (8) as follows: 
rJF (λ) = R[y(λ) - w(λ)] - s[JF (λ) - JV ]                                                    (26) 
) J J ( s ) w y ( R J r V F F − − − =                                                                       (27) 
 Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
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Using equations (25), (26) and (9), we establish the surplus generated by 
the least productive job, relative to a vacancy, and the average surplus 
generated by a filled job: 
[]
s r
J J q
s r
c ) ( w ) ( y R J ) ( J
V F
V F +
− −
+
+ − = − λ λ λ                                              (28) 
[]
q s r
c w y R J J V F + +
+ − = −                                                                           (29)   
Therefore, if we integrate the equations (23), (24), (28) and (29) in 
equation (18), the surplus sharing implies: 
0 =
+ +
+ − −
+ +
− − − − +
q s r
c w y q
p s r
b w p t b c ) ( y λ                                            (30) 
Equations (12) and (13) show that employers and employees share the 
surplus resulting from their collaboration based on their respective bargaining 
strength: 
[] U E V F W W J J − −
− = − ) 1 (
1
γ β
β                                                                  (31) 
If we take the equations (24) and (29), we have: 
q s r
c w y
p s r
b w
+ +
+ − − =
+ +
− − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( γ β β                                                                 (32) 
So, with equation (30): 
[] [ ] 0
) ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( =
+ + −
− − + − − − + −
p s r
b w q p b c t y
γ β
β γ β λ                                         (33) 
According to equations (8), (14) and (24): 
[] [ ]
s r
) ( w w R
s r
) ( y y R ) ( J J F F +
− −
+
− = − λ λ λ                                                  (34) 
But, using equations (6) and (21), we deduce: 
[]
s r
t ) ( w w R ) ( W W E E +
+ − = − λ λ                                                                  (35) 
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We show then: 
[] [ ] ) ( W W
s r
t ) ( y y R ) ( J J E E F F λ λ λ − −
+
+ − = −                                              (36) 
Therefore, equations (14), (31) and (36) give: 
[]
) ( ) 1 (
) ( ) 1 (
s r
t y y R W W U E + −
+ − − = − βγ
λ γ β                                                          (37) 
Therefore, substituting the expressions (37) and (24), we establish: 
[]
s r
t y y
p s r
b w
+
+ −
−
− =
+ +
− ) (
1
) 1 ( λ
βγ
γ β                                                                 (38) 
Finally, combining equations (33) and (38), we obtain: 
[] [ ][ ] p q t y y b c t y s r ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( γ β β λ λ βγ − + − + − = − + − + −                (39) 
Using equations (25) and (38), we get: 
[ ]
s r
t y y p
t b w
+
+ −
−
−
= − −
) (
1
) 1 (
) (
λ
βγ
γ β
λ                                                (40) 
Equation (39) can be written as follows: 
[] [] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
1 ) ( s r w y t y y q c s r + − − + −
−
− = + λ λ λ
βγ
β                              (41) 
In the equilibrium, the labor market participation implies: 
WU = WI                                                                                                  (42) 
Using equations (14) and (42), we deduce in the equilibrium: 
WU = WE(λ) = WI                                                                                    (43) 
Combining equations (3), (7), (21) and (42), we establish a third 
expression of (WE - WU): 
p
) b m z ( R W W U E − + = −                                                                               (44) 
Using equations (37) and (44), we obtain a decreasing relationship 
between λ and θ: Samir Amine, Pedro Lages Dos Santos 
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[] ) (
1
) )( 1 ( ) ( b m z s r t y y p − +
−
+ − = + −
γ
βγ λ β                                              (18) 
Using equations (40) and (18), we obtain the reservation wage expression: 
w(λ) = t + z + m                                                                                     (45) 
Therefore, equations (41) and (45) give: 
[] [] ) ( ) ( ) ( 1
1 ) ( s r m z t y t y y q c s r + − − − − + − −
− = + λ λ βγ
β                             (15) 
The equilibrium values(λ
* ;θ
*) are given by: 
[] [] ) ( ) ( ) ( 1
1 ) ( s r m z t y t y y q c s r + − − − − + − −
− = + λ λ βγ
β                              (15) 
[] ) (
1
) )( 1 ( ) ( b m z s r t y y p − +
−
+ − = + −
γ
βγ λ β                                              (18) 